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How is China thinking about protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and maritime 
chokepoints in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in times of crisis or conflict? Relying on Chinese 
policy documents and writings by Chinese security analysts, this report argues that three critical 
challenges limit the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) ability to project power into the 
region and defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints, particularly in times of crisis: (1) the PLAN’s 
relatively modest presence in the region compared to other powers, (2) its limited air defense and 
anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and (3) its limited logistics and sustainment infrastructure in the 
region. To address these challenges, Beijing has already undertaken a series of initiatives, including 
expanding the capabilities of China’s base in Djibouti and leveraging the nation’s extensive 
commercial shipping fleet to provide logistics support. Evidence suggests that the PRC may also be 
pursuing other policy options as well, such as increasing the number of advanced PLAN assets 
deployed to the region and establishing additional overseas military facilities.  
Introduction 
How is China thinking about protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC) and maritime 
chokepoints in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in times of crisis or conflict? To date, much research 
has examined the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) approach to non-traditional security 
operations in the region, including ongoing counter piracy operations, humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief efforts, and non-combatant evacuation operations.1 However, China’s 
interests in the IOR continue to expand. Economically, China has grown increasingly reliant on crude 
oil imports from the Middle East, which travel through the IOR, while the region itself has emerged 
as a critical component of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” which aims to extend influence 
abroad by leveraging Chinese lending, foreign direct investment (FDI), and technical expertise to 
construct infrastructure projects worldwide.2 Xi himself has visited the IOR at least 18 times since 
becoming Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary in fall 2012, including his 2013 trip to 
Tanzania, his second foreign trip after assuming leadership.3 As China’s IOR interests grow, the 
PLAN must grapple with the issue of maintaining access to regional SLOCs and chokepoints not just 
in peacetime, but during crisis and conflict, to include possible conflicts with great powers in the 
region such as India or the United States. 
This report seeks to provide insight into that question, examining how the PLAN views SLOC and 
maritime chokepoint protection in the Indian Ocean in times of crisis or conflict. The report analyzes 
writings by Chinese security analysts on this issue, focusing in particular on PLAN deficiencies that 
 
1 For a small sample, see Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Anti-Piracy 
Operations in the Gulf of Aden, Naval War College China Maritime Study 10 (November 2013); Phillip C. Saunders and 
Michael Swaine, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National defense 
University Press, 2011); and Matthew Southerland, “The Chinese Military’s Role in Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief: Contributions and Concerns,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 11, 2019, 
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_The%20Chinese%20Military%E2%80%99s%20R
ole%20in%20Overseas%20Humanitarian%20Assistance%20and%20Disaster%20Relief_7.11.19.pdf.     
2 “Silk Road ‘Project of the Century’,” The Standard, May 15, 2015,  http://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-
news.php?id=182837. 
3 “Chinese President Starts State Visit to Tanzania,” Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, March 25, 2013, www.mfa.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zt/1/t1024544.htm; “Travel and Appearances for:  Xi Jinping,” China 




could affect SLOC protection operations in the Indian Ocean. The report also examines ongoing 
PLAN activities in the region to better understand how it may be thinking about resolving those 
deficiencies, and what activities, if undertaken, could help address them. 
China’s desire to protect access to Indian Ocean SLOCs and maritime chokepoints is largely a 
function of the country’s growing national interests, which the PLAN has been given responsibility 
to safeguard. These include ensuring access to supplies of crude oil from the Middle East to protect 
the nation’s energy security, defending China’s growing expatriate community in the region, and 
protecting overseas investments.  
Chinese policy documents and writings by Chinese security analysts clearly indicate that the PLAN 
may one day be called upon to defend those interests. However, while the PLAN’s ability to operate 
in the Indian Ocean has improved considerably, its ability to project power into the region, and 
defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints in times of crisis, remains limited. Specifically, writings by 
Chinese security analysts and statements and actions by government and military personnel make it 
clear that the PLAN is well aware of its (1) relatively modest presence in the region compared to 
other regional powers, (2) limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, and (3) 
logistics and sustainment challenges in the region. However, as the PLAN’s capabilities improve, so 
too will its ability to address these challenges. Understanding how the PLAN might remedy these 
deficiencies, and therefore what to watch for in the future, will be of value as China’s position in the 
region evolves. 
SLOCs and Chokepoints: PRC Strategic Interests in the Indian Ocean Region 
Chinese security analysts have long noted the importance of Indian Ocean SLOCs. They are the 
primary conduits connecting China to critical overseas interests in the Middle East and Europe. 
These SLOCs are vulnerable to closure at several narrow passages or chokepoints: the Malacca Strait 
in the east and the Strait of Hurmuz, Bab El Mandab, and Suez Canal in the west. China’s continued 
access to Indian Ocean SLOCs, and the maritime chokepoints at both ends, is crucial to maintaining 
access to energy resources and trade markets and protecting China’s growing expatriate community 
and overseas investments. 
First, China’s reliance on energy imports originating from the Middle East and traversing the Strait 
of Hurmuz continues to grow. For example, in 2018 China imported roughly 9.3 million barrels of 
crude oil per day, roughly 10 percent more than in 2017, making China the world’s largest crude oil 
importer for the second year in a row.4 Nearly half of China’s crude oil imports in 2018 (roughly 44 
percent) originated from the Middle East (see Exhibit 1).5  
 
4 海关统计数据在线查询平台 [Customs Statistical Data Online Inquiry Database], http://43.248.49.97/; “China Ends 
2018 with 10% Crude Import Growth,” S&P Global Platts, January 14, 2019, www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-
insights/latest-news/oil/011419-chinas-2018-crude-oil-imports-rise-10-to-928-mil-b-d. 




Exhibit 1. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Country, 2018 
Indian Ocean SLOCs are also some of the primary east-west routes through which Chinese goods 
travel to Africa and farther afield to Europe. Roughly 20 percent of China’s GDP is derived from the 
export of goods and services, and China now ranks as the world’s largest trading nation, with roughly 
13 percent of all the world’s exports and 10 percent of the world’s imports.6 Indian Ocean SLOCs 
also provide the fastest routes through which PLAN ships can reach China’s expatriate community 
and growing investments in the region. Between 2017–18 alone, for example, China invested over 
$143 billion in the region, according to the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment 
Tracker (see Exhibit 2).7  
 
6 “Country Profiles—China,” World Trade Oranization—Trade Profiles, 2017, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN; “Exports of Goods and 
Services (% of GDP),” World Bank, 2017, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=US&type=points&view=map. For comparison, roughly 
12 percent of U.S. GDP is derived from the export of goods and services. 
7 American Enterprise Institute, Chinese Global Investment Tracker, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-




Exhibit 2. Destinations for Chinese Investment in the Indian Ocean Region (2017-2018) 
Chinese Thinking about SLOC Protection 
As maritime trade grows more critical to Chinese economic development, maintaining access to the 
sea routes that connect China with markets in the Middle East and onward to Europe and North 
America becomes a higher priority. To be sure, this issue is not new: the PRC government has been 
encouraging Chinese businesses to invest abroad since as early as 1999, with the advent of Hu 
Jintao’s “Go Out strategy” (走出去战略).8 Five years later, Hu’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” 
speech gave the PLA the task of defending China’s overseas interests.9 Researchers at the Naval 
Research Institute, the PLAN’s top strategic think tank, argued in 2014 that China’s “distant-ocean 
lifeline” (远洋生命线) is mostly concentrated in the route from the Malacca Strait [extending across] 
the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and North Africa,” and that maintaining China’s “seapower” (海
权) in the region will be critical.10 The PLAN’s responsibilities for protecting China’s overseas 
interests was further solidified in the 2015 national defense white paper, which stated that “with the 
 
8 更好地实施“走出去”战略 [“Implement the ‘Going Out’ Strategy Even Better”], Central Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, March 15, 2006, www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227686.htm. 
9 Daniel Hartnett, “The PLA’s Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad, March 4, 2009, 
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.4.09Hartnett.pdf. 
10  李剑, 陈文文, 金晶 [Li Jian, Chen Wenwen, and Jin Jing], 印度样海权格局与中国海权的印度洋扩展 [“Overall 
Situation of Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and the Expansion in the Indian Ocean of Chinese Sea Powers”] 太平洋学报 
[Pacific Journal] 22, no. 5 (2014), pp. 68–75. 
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growth of China’s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and 
regional turmoil…and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel, and assets abroad, has 
become an imminent issue.” (emphasis added)11 
Chinese security analysts highlight the need to be able to defend those interests during a conflict.12 
For example, Senior Captain Liang Fang at the Chinese National Defense University notes that the 
U.S. Navy’s (USN) success has been predicated on the establishment of military facilities around the 
world—which the author refers to as “strategic islands” (战略岛屿)—allowing the USN to control 
the world’s critical SLOCs and chokepoints. Within the Indian Ocean, Liang notes two locations, 
Diego Garcia and Bahrain, as particularly important.13 Based on this view of the USN’s success, 
Senior Captain Liang advocates deploying China’s future carriers to protect SLOC access.14 Noting 
the importance of SLOCs to Chinese energy security, Gao Wensheng at Tianjin Normal University 
argues that the U.S. has “achieved unprecedented maritime hegemony” (史无前例的海洋霸权) 
through the control of strategic SLOCs. Gao advocates that China establish its own “strategic 
fulcrum ports” (战略支点港口) to avoid having its energy supplies cut off in future conflicts.15 
Yet if protecting access to Indian Ocean SLOCs and maritime chokepoints during a conflict is 
China’s goal, writings by Chinese security analysts and the record of PLAN activities point to three 
critical deficiencies, which the service will need to overcome. First, the PLAN has a limited Indian 
Ocean footprint compared to other regional navies such as India and the United States. Second, it 
faces air and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vulnerabilities. Third, the PLAN would likely face 
logistics and sustainment challenges for its ships during a crisis. Each of these is examined below.  
Limited Indian Ocean Presence  
For the PLAN to defend its access to Indian Ocean SLOCs and chokepoints during a conflict, it 
would first have to significantly increase what is currently a modest presence in the region. This 
point is made by Chinese security analysts who draw a direct line from the PLAN’s ability to contest 
U.S. naval power in the far seas (including the Indian Ocean) to the PLAN’s ability to defend 
China’s interests in the near seas.16 As one professor from China’s National University of Defense 
Technology noted, in order to defend China’s near seas interests, the PLAN must “develop coercive, 
 
11 See, for example, China’s 2015 defense white paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, “China's Military Strategy,” Xinhua, May 26, 2015. 
12 For other examples, see Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-Intervention?” The 
Washington Quarterly (Fall 2015), pp. 143–56; Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: 
Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives, no. 12 (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 2017). 
13 梁芳 [Liang Fang], 美国控制海上战略通道的理论实践与启示 [“The Theory and Practice of U.S. Control of Maritime 
Strategic Access and Its Implications”], 刊物名字 [Journal of Ocean University of China], no. 5 (2019), pp. 39–46.   
14 梁芳 [Liang Fang], 今日’海上丝绸之路’通道风险有多大 [“The Risks of the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ Are Great”], 国防
参考 [National Defense Reference], February 11, 2015, http://www.81.cn/2015ChinasRegionalSecurity/2015-
02/13/content_6355093.htm. 
15 高文胜 [Gao Wenshen], 南太平洋能源战略通道的价值、面临的风险及中国的对策 [“The Value of the South 
Pacific Strategic Energy Channel, the Risks it Faces, and China’s Countermeasures”] 世界地理研究 [World Regional 
Studies], no. 6 (2017), section 4.1. 
16 胡欣 [Hu Xin], 国家利益扩展与海外战略支撑点建设 [“The Expansion of National Interests and the Building of 
Overseas Strategic Support Points”], 世界经济与政治论坛 [World Economics and Political Forum], no. 1 (2019), p. 25.  
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counterstrike, naval maneuver operations” in the far seas in order to “fulfill its far seas protection 
duties, break[ing] through the island chain, [and] crack[ing] the Malacca dilemma.17       
At present, however, the PLAN has only a handful of ships deployed to the Indian Ocean at any one 
time, as well as roughly two submarine deployments annually.18 Most of these ships are in the region 
as part of the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy operations. Since 2008, the PLAN has kept on 
station a three-ship taskforce usually consisting of two warships: a destroyer and frigate or two 
frigates, and one auxiliary ship.  
More recently, PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly on the eastern end, has increased, as 
the PLAN has conducted more training operations west of the Malacca Strait. For example, in 2014 
the PLAN held its first “two ocean” deployment, with a three-ship taskforce conducting exercises 
south of Java immediately after conducting an “‘enemy’ blockade area drill” (“敌”封锁区演练).19 In 
2018, a four-ship task force, which included a Type 052D (Luyang III) destroyer, a Type 054A 
(Jiangkai II) frigate, an amphibious transport dock, and a replenishment ship, conducted drills in the 
eastern Indian Ocean before sailing north into the Philippine Sea.20 Such operations provide 
invaluable training opportunities, while also normalizing China’s presence in the region.21 
Even with this expanded presence, however, the number of PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean falls 
well short of other regional surface fleets, such as those of India or the United States. At present, the 
Indian navy, for example, has six “Aegis-like” modern destroyers, nine modern frigates, the 
Vikramaditya carrier, and numerous older ships and submarines.22 The U.S. Navy is likely to have a 
carrier strike group in the region as well, including its carrier air wing and associated destroyer 
squadron.23         
Expanding the PLAN’s Indian Ocean presence would not be impossible. China’s navy is already the 
largest in the world, with over 300 ships, including over 100 warships and submarines capable of 
conducting Indian Ocean operations.24 Some estimate that by 2030 the PLAN could have over 400 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 “PLA Submarines in the Indian Ocean Legitimate: China,” The Economic Times, July 12, 2018, 
https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/pla-submarines-in-indian-ocean-legitimate-china/articleshow/53100318.cms. 
19 海军南海舰队远海训练编队起航 [“PLAN South Sea Fleet Far Seas Training Formation Sets Sail”] Central 
Government Portal of the People’s Republic of China, January 20, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2014-
01/20/content_2571189.htm. For an overview of PLAN far seas training operations, see Ryan D. Martinson, “China’s Far 
Seas Naval Operations, From the Year of the Snake to the Year of the Pig,” Center for International Maritime Security 
(CIMSEC), February 18, 2019, http://cimsec.org/chinas-far-seas-naval-operations-from-the-year-of-the-snake-to-the-year-
of-the-pig/39745.    
20 Martinson, “China’s Far Seas Naval Operations”; Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Flexing Muscles? China Stages Rare Mid-Sea 
Drills in Eastern Indian Ocean,” India Today, February 20, 2018, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/flexing-muscles-
china-stages-rare-mid-sea-drills-in-eastern-indian-ocean-1173656-2018-02-20.     
21 Li Tang and Chen Guoquan: “In the Far and Wide Ocean, Witness the Jointing Development of PLAN,” PLA Daily 
Online, June 22, 2017, https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_06_22_414496.shtml?s=fwckhfbt.  
22 “India Navy,” Jane’s World Navies, July 3, 2019, https://ihsmarkit.com/products/janes-world-navies.html.   
23 As of October 21, 2019, for example, the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group was in the Arabian Sea. See “USNI 
News Fleet and Marine Tracker: Oct. 21, 2019,” U.S. Naval Institute Website, October 21, 2019, 
https://news.usni.org/2019/10/21/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-oct-21-2019#more-70501.  
24 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for 
Congress,” August 30, 2019, pp. 16-17, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/224.  
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vessels in its fleet, as well as roughly 100 submarines. This would give it more than enough assets to 
protect China’s near seas interests and expand its presence in the Indian Ocean.25 Indeed, some 
suggest that China is already capable of maintaining about 18 ships on station full-time in the Indian 
Ocean, given the PLAN’s current force posture.26 
Chinese security analysts rarely discuss the idea of a PLAN Indian Ocean squadron directly. When 
the topic does arise, it is often only to refute foreign media reports that suggest the possibility.27 Yet 
the PLAN is already establishing the capabilities that would allow it to significantly increase Indian 
Ocean ship deployments in the future. For example, one of the six berths at the Doraleh Multipurpose 
Port, near the PLA base in Djibouti, is reserved for the PLAN’s use.28 China also continues to build 
pier space on the base itself, which, according to sources cited in the South China Morning Post, will 
allow it to “support a four-ship flotilla at least, including China’s new generation Type 901 supply 
ship.”29 While these ships could also be used to support other vessels in the fleet, given their limited 
numbers, and the fact that they were designed to support the PLAN’s future carrier strike groups, 
expanding facilities in Djibouti to support Type 901s may indicate that the base could also host a 
PLAN carrier strike group in the future. 
Indeed, the size and nature of the facilities being built at Djibouti suggest that the PLAN is 
establishing the capability to support a carrier strike group from its first overseas base should it so 
chose. China’s current carrier fighter aircraft, the J-15, continues to suffer from multiple challenges 
operating from China’s carriers, including limited range and payload.30 However, the presence of a 
PLAN carrier strike group off the Bab El Mandeb strait would improve the PLAN’s force projection 
capabilities, while affecting the decision making calculus of countries in the region. Thus, the 
number, type, and duration of PLAN ships visiting the base will be important to watch when seeking 
to gauge future Chinese intentions in the region.  
Weak Anti-air and Anti-submarine Defense  
A second challenge to protecting Indian Ocean SLOCs and maritime chokepoints is the PLAN’s 
limited anti-air and ASW capabilities in the region. When close to home, the PLAN enjoys the 
 
25 James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure,” Naval War College 
Review 72, no. 1 (2019), p. 33.  
26 Rear Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt, “Is the Past Prologue: PLA Navy Presence in the Indian Ocean?” Paper 
Presented at the conference Views of China’s Presence in the Indian Ocean Region, June 17-18, 2019, Hilton Arlington 
Hotel, Arlington, VA, p. 25.  
27 See for example Wendell Minnick, “Experts: Chinese ‘4th Fleet’ Appears Unlikely,” Defense News, February 6, 2015, 
www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/02/06/experts-chinese-4th-fleet-appears-unlikely/. See also an opinion piece written 
anonymously by “a sincere solider with something to say” (至诚大兵  我有话说) 中国将组第 4 舰队剑指印度洋? [“Will 
China Establish a 4th Fleet in the Indian Ocean?”], Sina, February 5, 2015, http://news.sina.com.cn/zl/mil/blog/2015-02-
05/15493169/1295335170/4d353f020102vhc4.shtml.   
28 Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker and Patrick deGategno, China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and 
Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2017), p. 26; “China 
Sends Forces to its First Military Base Abroad, in Djibouti,” LA Times, July 12, 2017, www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-
china-military-base-djibouti-20170712-story.html.  
29 Minnie Chan, “China Plans to Build Djibouti Facility to Allow Naval Flotilla to Dock at First Overseas Base,” South 
China Morning Post, September 27, 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2112926/china-plans-
build-djibouti-facility-allow-naval.  




advantage of operating under the cover of China’s shore-based air defense systems and land-based 
aircraft. PLAN ships are also protected from submarine attacks by the presence of the PLAN’s own 
submarines, as well as land-based ASW aircraft and a host of sensors and other equipment in the near 
seas. This calculation changes dramatically, however, when operating in the Indian Ocean, as the 
PLAN would not only be operating without its land-based air and ASW defenses, but would also be 
operating within range of the land-based airpower of potential adversaries such as India. PLAN ships 
would also have to deal with the threat of enemy submarine attacks without the benefit of land-based 
and near seas ASW defenses. According to one Chinese security analyst, in the western Indian Ocean 
India enjoys “extremely favorable” (天时地利人和) circumstances.”31 
Even just entering the Indian Ocean during a conflict may pose problems for the PLAN, as India has 
sought to improve its ability to detect PLAN submarines entering the region. In the Northern Indian 
Ocean, the PLAN would have to contend with India’s expanding military presence in the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands. In early 2019, the Indian navy upgraded naval air station Shibpur (now INS 
Kohassa) on North Andaman Island. It already operates out of an air force base at Car Nicobar and a 
naval air station in Campbell Bay.32 Currently, INS Kohassa is equipped to accommodate helicopter 
and maritime patrol aircraft, improving India’s ability to detect submarines and other assets as they 
transit the Malacca Strait. The Indian navy also plans to expand the runway to accommodate fighter 
aircraft.33 
While not a complete solution, one way the PLAN might begin addressing its anti-air and ASW 
challenges in the Indian Ocean is by deploying more of its advanced warships to the region. The 
PLAN’s Type 052D destroyers, for example, are equipped with a 64-cell vertical launch system and 
modern long-range anti-air missiles, allowing them to engage multiple air targets simultaneously.34 
They can also carry CY-5 series anti-submarine missiles and Yu-7 torpedoes, as well as Harbin Z‐9 
or Kamov Ka‐28 helicopters for improved ASW capabilities.35 To date, however, these ships have 
rarely been deployed to the region. For example, although the PLAN now has at least 20 such 
destroyers, between 2014 (when they came into service) and May 2019, none had participated in a 
Gulf of Aden counterpiracy taskforce (see Exhibit 3).  
 
31 何雨 [He Yu], 基于‘21 世纪海上丝绸之路’建设的‘一海两洋’战略研究 [“Strategic Study of ‘One Sea and Two 
Oceans’ Based on the Construction of ‘Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century”], 海南热带海洋学院学报 [Journal of 
Hainan Tropical Ocean University] 25, no. 1 (2018), p. 26.  
32 Sanjeev Miglani, “India Navy Set to Open Third Base in Strategic Islands to Counter China,” Reuters, January 23, 2019, 
www.reuters.com/article/us-india-navy-base/india-navy-set-to-open-third-base-in-strategic-islands-to-counter-china-
idUSKCN1PH17Y.  
33 “INS Kohassa—A New Bird’s Nest in the Andamans,” Indian Navy Website, January 24, 2019, 
www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-kohassa-%E2%80%93-new-bird%E2%80%99s-nest-andamans.  
34 Rear Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt, Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: The 
CNA Corporation, 2016), pp. 42, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf.  





Exhibit 3. PLAN ship types in Gulf of Aden escort operations 2008-201836 
This is starting to change, however. In the summer of 2019, the Type 052D destroyer Xining took 
part in a Gulf of Aden escort operation for the first time, accompanying a Type 054A frigate and a 
Type 903A replenishment ship.37 To be sure, deploying one Type 052D destroyer as part of a Gulf of 
Aden taskforce is far from a solution to the PLAN’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean; nor is it a 
clear indication that the PLAN is actually attempting to address this problem in the near term. 
However, greater numbers and more routine deployments of such ships, which would allow their 
crews to gain experience operating in the region, may be a first step towards addressing those 
deficiencies.  
The PLA’s facilities near the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean may also help address its anti-
air and ASW deficiencies by allowing it to more rapidly deploy ships and aircraft to key chokepoints 
in greater numbers. For example, in 2015 it was reported that China had completed its second carrier 
base at Yulin on Hainan island. Yulin is already home to various classes of PLAN submarines, and at 
least one Chinese academic has argued that the relative proximity of these facilities to the Malacca 
Strait makes it an obvious location to homeport a carrier in support of the PLAN’s SLOC-protection 
mission, allowing it to defend access to the Indian Ocean more effectively.38   
 
36 Jeffrey Becker, Erica Downs and Ben DeThomas, China’s Presence in the Middle East and Western Indian Ocean: 
Beyond Belt and Road, (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, February 2019), p. 71. 
37 “China's 33rd Naval Escort Fleet Sets Sail for Gulf of Aden,” CCTV Video News Agency, August 29, 2019, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApWZ5XvUVlI.  
38 See 马尧 [Ma Yao], 航母基地选址要攻防兼顾，南海何以得天独厚? [“The Aircraft Carrier’s Base Location Must Be 
For Both Attack and Defense, Why is the South China Sea Unique?], The Paper, August 3, 2015, 
https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1359809; Zachary Keck, “China Builds World's Largest Aircraft Carrier Dock 
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China’s military facilities in the South China Sea may also be of value. Since 2013, China has 
created roughly 3,200 acres of new land through island-building activities in the Spratlys.39 Three in 
particular—Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef—all have hardened shelters with 
retractable roofs, which appear capable of housing surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Many 
locations also have the space to host large numbers of ships within expansive harbors, allowing 
China to surge PLAN ships from these facilities.40 Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi also have hangers 
capable of accommodating up to twenty-four combat aircraft each, as well as bomber, transport, and 
refueling aircraft.41 Should the PLAN be tasked with defending access to the Malacca Strait in a 
crisis, PLAN ships and aircraft based in the Spratlys could respond much more rapidly than forces 
based further away on Hainan Island or the mainland. Moreover, if those forces were combined with 
a carrier strike group, possibly homeported on Hainan Island, the PLAN would then have a force that 
could indeed help China to finally “crack” its Malacca Dilemma.42 
Finally, China may also seek to establish a second overseas base, this time on the eastern end of the 
Indian Ocean, which may also help it to defend access to the region. For many years, Chinese 
analysts have discussed possible locations for an overseas base in the eastern IOR, to include 
Myanmar or possibly Cambodia, which lies just east of the Malay Peninsula.43 China has long had 
strong military and economic ties with the Cambodian government, and while Cambodia’s 
constitution prohibits the presence of foreign military bases on its territory, military relations 
between the two have grown more exclusive in recent years.44 In the summer of 2019, it was reported 
that China had reached an agreement with the government of Cambodia to allow the PLAN to use a 
Cambodian naval base near Sihanoukville.45 Although Cambodia is located roughly 650 miles from 
the eastern entrance of the Malacca Straits, depending on what the PLAN or PLA Air Force 
deployed, a presence there could improve China’s maritime domain awareness, helping address some 
of the anti-air and AWS challenges the PLAN now faces. 
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Inadequate Logistics and Sustainment 
Perhaps the most commonly discussed challenge facing PLAN SLOC protection in the Indian Ocean 
is its inability to sustain the much larger and more diverse force that would be required for SLOC 
protection activities in a conflict. Over the past decade, the PLAN has proven capable of sustaining 
small groups of vessels in the Indian Ocean for long periods of time. However, though a three-ship 
taskforce is sufficient for the PLAN’s counterpiracy needs in peacetime, defending access to Indian 
Ocean SLOCs in a conflict would require a much larger and more sustained force, and the PLAN has 
only a limited number of replenishment ships capable of supporting far seas operations. This includes 
roughly eight Type 903/A (Fuchi) supply ships, which have been used extensively in the Gulf of 
Aden, and the newer Type 901 (Fuyu) fast combat support ship, designed to support future carrier 
operations.46 At present, however, the PLAN has only commissioned two of these ships, ostensibly 
one for each of the two carriers (Liaoning and Shandong, which was commissioned in December 
2019.) 
In the near term, the PLAN could mitigate this problem by leveraging China’s massive commercial 
fleet. China’s seagoing merchant marine fleet (including seagoing merchant vessels of at least 1,000 
gross tons) surpassed 165 million dead weight tonnes in 2017, making it one of the largest in the 
world.47 The PLAN could supplement its sustainment needs in the region in part by relying on this 
merchant fleet. Beijing has already taken steps so that the fleet can better support PLAN activities. 
For example, it has promulgated regulations requiring certain civilian vessels—including roll on/roll 
off vessels, tankers, and container ships—be built to military specifications, theoretically facilitating 
their future use by the navy with few if any modifications.48 In September 2016, the PRC enacted the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation, which improves the 
process for military requisition of civilian transportation assets during wartime, natural disasters, 
emergencies, or “special circumstances,” both domestically and abroad.49  Specifically, Article 38 
states that Chinese enterprises and agencies “shall provide shipping, aviation, vehicle, and personnel 
support for military actions in the protection of China’s overseas interests, international rescue, and 
maritime escorts.”50 According to an editorial in the PLA Daily, the law “will greatly enhance our 
military’s strategic maritime projection capability” (将大大提高我军海上战略投送能力).51 The 
PLAN has taken steps to implement these new regulations: Chinese commercial vessels have worked 
with the PLAN in both exercises and real-world operations. In the summer of 2016 for example, 
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civilian transport ships took part in a 10-day logistics support exercise led by the PLAN’s South Sea 
Fleet.52 With this foundation now well-established, Chinese commercial shipping firms, such as 
COSCO and others, could begin supporting the PLAN’s operations in the Indian Ocean, thus 
augmenting China’s limited far seas auxiliary fleet.  
Another related logistics challenge is the PLAN’s inability to preposition in the Indian Ocean 
specialized materials that would be required during a conflict, including ordnance and technical 
equipment to conduct specialized repairs. Most of the logistics support PLAN vessels receive in the 
region has come from commercial facilities. As a result of China’s growing investments, Chinese 
state-owned firms now operate port facilities across the Indian Ocean (see the below table ). 
Moreover, the PLAN has become adept at leveraging those facilities to obtain sustainment support 
for its ships while operating in the region during peacetime.  
Select Examples of China’s Involvement in Regional Ports53 
Country Port Terminal Operator Parties Share (%) 
Djibouti Djibouti Doraleh 
Multipurpose 
Port 
Port de Djibouti SA CMPH (China Merchants Port 
Holdings)/DPFZA (Djibouti 
Ports & Free Zones Authority) 
100 
Egypt Port Said  Suez Canal 
Container 
Terminal 
APM Terminals APM Terminals 
COSCO  
Suez Canal Authority 
Egyptian Private Sector 






Malaysia Port Klang  Westports 
Malaysia 
Hutchison Ports Hutchinson Ports 23.6 
Pakistan Gwadar All COPHC (China Overseas 
Ports Holding Company) 
COPHC  100 





Sri Lanka Ports Authority 
85 
10 
Sri Lanka Hambantota All MPMC Limited CMPH 
Sri Lanka Ports Authority 
85 
10 
UAE Khalifa Khalifa Port 
Container 
Terminal 2 
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However, other than its base in Djibouti, the PLAN does not, at present, appear to have arrangements 
with any other country in the region that would allow it to preposition specialized military equipment 
or technicians required to use that equipment, even in port facilities owned or operated by Chinese 
state-owned firms. Host governments whose ports do service PLAN vessels during a conflict, or 
allow the PLA to preposition military equipment on their territory, could possibly be dragged into the 
conflict as a co-belligerent.54 Chinese security analysts are well aware of these limitations, and the 
need to establish additional facilities that could be relied upon to support the PLAN in times of 
conflict, with some arguing that:  
the consumption of supplies for far seas ship formations is quite large, and the period 
of time it takes for replenishment is quite long…establishing an overseas support 
base (海外保障基地) can help our warship formations carry out far seas combat 
responsibilities more reliably and effectively, [thus] increasing our navy’s far seas 
combat power.55 
Yet at least in the near term, the likelihood of the PLAN obtaining access to a military facility which 
it could use during a conflict remains remote, as many IOR countries seek to maintain a balance in 
their relations between regional powers and appear unlikely to abandon this hedging approach. 
Seychelles’ engagement with both China and India over the past decade is an excellent illustration. In 
late 2011, China was reportedly offered access to naval facilities in Victoria, yet the deal fell through 
in part because of Indian objections.56 In 2018, Seychelles’ Parliament rejected the latest Indian 
request to establish military facilities on Assumption Island.57  
Elsewhere, however, China may be making progress. In the summer of 2019, it was reported that 
Chinese state firms were awarded a contract to build the Bangladesh navy a submarine, and provide 
training on its use and maintenance.58 Although Bangladesh government officials have been vocal in 
their reassurances that the facility will not be used by PLAN submarines, this and other Chinese 
activities that could be construed as attempts to establish access to military facilities in the IOR will 
undoubtedly be closely monitored by India, the United States and others with equities in the region.   
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Conclusion: The future of PLAN SLOC Protection in the Indian Ocean  
As China’s reliance on international markets and energy resources grows, protecting access to the 
Indian Ocean SLOCs and maritime chokepoints that connect China to those markets will become 
increasingly crucial. China’s leadership is fully aware that the PLAN may be called upon to defend 
this access in a conflict with other great powers, and the PLAN has made impressive advancements 
over the past two decades in its ability to operate in this region.  
Presently, however, the PLAN maintains only a modest footprint in the Indian Ocean compared to its 
competition, and it lacks the ability to sustain the type of large, diverse fleet required to be a 
formidable force. Moreover, PLAN anti-air and ASW defense limitations would put PLAN vessels at 
a distinct disadvantage during a regional conflict. Understanding these challenges, and how Chinese 
military and security analysts view them, may provide indications of what to look for in the future. A 
significant buildup of PLAN warships and logistics vessels in the region, for example, including 
future deployments of more advanced warships (including aircraft carriers), perhaps to Djibouti, 
would be a necessary step towards developing adequate SLOC protection capabilities in a conflict. It 
would also be a possible indication that China’s leaders are reevaluating the PLAN’s role in the 
region. Other activities, such as the development of air defense or ASW capabilities in Djibouti, the 
continued buildup of capabilities in the South China Sea along the eastern periphery of the Indian 
Ocean, or successfully negotiating agreements with regional countries that provide the PLAN with 
access to dedicated military facilities, may indicate a change as well.     
Yet despite China’s growing regional interests, given the many challenges described above, some 
have suggested that the PLAN’s future in the Indian Ocean may resemble the Soviet Union’s past, 
with the Chinese navy continuing to build up its forces, yet content to compete for political and 
maritime influence,59 or limited SLOC protection and localized sea denial, as opposed to outright sea 
control.60 While it may be too soon to know what shape the PLAN’s future Indian Ocean strategy 
will take, understanding what to watch for will be critical, as China’s growing interests and activities 
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